FRIENDSHIP

After 35 years looking for a long, lost Vietnamese friend after the Viet Nam war is over, on August 20, 2010, a retired Lt. Col. Hardy Bryan received a phone call. It was from me. Above the ad that he posted on many Vietnamese magazines, all over the country. 

He cried a lot learning that my dad, Lt Col. Nguyen Van Toàn, after spending a decade in Communist labor camps, couldn't make it in a sea escape attempt in 1986. Through tears, he told me his memories with my dad during the war and I told him mine as if they were yesterday.

This is one of the dry, war stories he wrote in which my dad was a part of it during the Viet Nam war in 1972.

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Tay Ninh

Republic of South Vietnam

by Hardy W. Bryan, Lt. Col, QMC (Ret.)

Units: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Advisory Team 9

Third Area Logistics Command, Army of the Republic of Vietnam

130th Quartermaster Group, ARVN

331st Quartermaster Battalion, (POL Field Depot, Saigon) ARVN

331st Quartermaster Battalion, (POL Sub-Deport, Tay Ninh) ARVN

All units in III Corps were based in Saigon, except for the Sub-depot. Advisory Team 9 provided guidance to the Third Area Logistics Command and its assigned units. This command had the mission of providing all logistical services and supplies to ARVN forces in III Corps, basically an area from the Mekong Delta in the south to the Central Highlands in the north, from the South China Sea in the east to Cambodia in the west. Since this area included the national capitol, Saigon, it had a paramount role to fulfill. Of interest to this report is the Quartermaster Group and its POL mission.

The ARVN forces had recently performed well in repulsing the enemy TET Offensive of 1972. With minimum support from U.S. combat units, air and naval power, a determined, well trained and supplied enemy force of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army regulars were in a general retreat. The enemy forces escaped into the safety of Cambodia. Between III Corps and IV Corps, a piece of land known as Parrots Peak extended into Vietnam; however, this land was Cambodian and was off limits to the allied forces. This land was comprised of huge rubber plantations. Nevertheless, ARVN forces continued to pursue the enemy forces, attacking into Parrots Peak and into eastern Cambodia, denying the enemy its usual sanctuary.

In March 1972, the ARVN divisions were being supplied from a sub-depot in Tay Ninh, a provincial capitol near the border of Cambodia. Of interest is the POL facility at the airfield. There were two 10,000-barrel steel-bolted tanks that supplied jet fuel to the ARVN helicopters operating deep in Cambodia. Each of these tanks was inside an earth berm designed to hold the contents of the tanks in the event of a rupture. These two tanks were connected to each other in series by a six-inch pipe that ran from one tank to the other; another six-inch pipe went from one tank to the airfield where the system allowed eight helicopters to be fueled at the same time. Gate valves were installed on the pipes leading from the tanks at the bottom near ground level. It was an effective and simple system that did have a flaw. What happens when something goes wrong? There was no alternate way to route the fuel.

On the night of 21 March 1972, with the ARVN forces operating at the outer end of its helicopter support umbrella for both air cover and re-supply, a Viet Cong rocket landed inside the berm of the tank nearest the air field. The explosion punctured the tank in several places and caused a large volume of fire. As the tank heated up and JP4 vapors were escaping the relief valves on top of the tank, flames jumped to the top. The entire tank was burning. This was the tank that was in the middle, between the other tank and the airfield, and it was through this tank the contents of the other tank flowed. The supply of JP4 was stopped. The ARVN forces lost their air support and were in danger of facing a counterattack. This probably would have resulted in significant military losses and threatened the security of Saigon, since its main body of troops was engaged in this battle.

Early on 22 March 1972, the Commander of the Third Area Logistics Command, Colonel Tran Quoc Khang, requested help from MACV Team 9, lead by Colonel E. Ross Johnson. Colonel Johnson summoned his two Quartermaster Advisors, Major Hardy W. Bryan III and Captain Donald W. Hart, informing them of the gravity of the situation, and dispatching them immediately. Both officers learned their ARVN counterparts were also en route.

Upon arrival, Major Bryan quickly located his counterpart, Lt. Col. Toan Nguyen, Commander of the 130th Quartermaster Group. He was under great pressure to put the fire out and to resume fuel operations, but the situation was overwhelming and he had no immediate solution to the problem. The tank was still burning with flames high above the tank, continually being fed by hot JP4 escaping from the safety valves on top of the tank. The Tay Ninh Fire Department was there. This fire fighting force consisted of one small, aged truck, which carried about 500 gallons of water. Since there was no water supply at the scene, the truck and its crew would empty the contents of the truck onto the fire and then leave the area to refill its tank. Using only water, it had no effect on the fire but may have contributed to cooling the fuel tank.

The ARVN officers and the two advisors surveyed the situation and reviewed their options. There were no other POL facilities which could adequately carry the mission in the area. There was a discussion of bringing a portable system from the 331st Quartermaster Battalion in Saigon, but that would have taken too much time to transport, set up, fill and begin to operate. Also considered was bringing as many 5000 gallon tanker trucks as possible and feeding the system from them. That seemed to be the best solution and orders were sent to the Petroleum Battalion to do so. The portable system was also ordered. Having done what seemed to be all that could be done, Captain Hart drove to the Sub-depot so see if he could find any POL equipment that could be utilized to hook up the tankers to the system. He returned with a jeep full of assault hose designed to move POL through the battlefield.

The advisors verified that there was sufficient hose and that the couplings could be used

to connect the hose line to the existing pipes. With all gate valves closed, the pipe at

the bottom of the tank not on fire was disconnected and reconnected to the hose. There was concern that the small amount of JP4 that was in the pipe could vaporize and catch fire, so efforts were made to direct this spillage away from the fire. The hose line was laid outside the berm around the burning tank to the pipeline running from the tank to the airfield. Another break was made in the pipeline and the hose was coupled to the pipe. The valves were then opened and some fuel was allowed to flush through the system and through the filter separator. Once the system was rechecked and the advisors knew there was no contamination in the JP4, fuel began flowing from the tank, around the burning tank, to the airfield. As a direct result of this field-expedient solution, an adequate supply of JP4 was resumed to the airfield and the mission of the ARVN forces was restored.

No loss of fighting capability was experienced by ARVN. It took Major Bryan and Captain Hart less than two hours after their arrival on the scene to resume the JP4 supply. This temporary system was established while working within a few feet of the fire. This solution worked so well that only the 5000-gallon tanker trucks needed to re-supply the one tank continued to come to Tay Ninh; the others were cancelled. The portable system was also cancelled.

Now attention could be directed at putting out the fire. A huge column of flame and black smoke could be seen for miles, and this could aid the enemy by pinpointing the location of the airfield. No progress was being made in extinguishing the blaze; and in fact, the fire truck left the scene and did not return. This was really not a loss since the fire department’s efforts were ineffective. Major Bryan then requested help from the U.S. Army firefighters stationed in Saigon. A CH-47 Chinook helicopter was dispatched and loaded with fire-fighting foam, and a large capacity bucket suspended under the aircraft. Upon arrival, the aircraft landed and offloaded the foam. Then several attempts at dousing the fire were made using water scooped up from a nearby river and dropped directly on the tank. This had a temporary effect but as soon as the water ran off the tank, the flames would leap up from the side of the tank and the fire re-ignited on the top. The aircraft landed and dumped some of the foam into the bucket, trying this with the same outcome. On a final effort, the entire capacity of the bucket was filled with foam solution and dumped on the fire, but that did not work either. It just was not possible to drop enough water or foam to completely douse the fire. After every drop, some fire remained and again, quickly engulfed the entire tank in fire. The fire burned itself out days later. The product in the tank was a total loss anyway as it was off-grade.

The goal of resuming a fuel supply was achieved, and this makeshift solution continued to operate for months until the system was restored, this time with a built-in capability of fueling from either tank. Lt. Col. Toan and the Commander of the Third Area Logistical Command for exceptionally meritorious service and outstanding performance of duty commended Major Bryan and Captain Hart. Colonel Khang awarded them Vietnamese Army medals at the end of their tours, and the citation mentioned the actions taken that day.